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Abstract 
This paper has three aims. Firstly, to remind accounting academics, practitioners and 
standard setters of the origins and the substance of the equity theories and the debate 
surrounding them that took place from the late 19
th
 century until the 1970s. Secondly, it seeks 
to understand why the equity theories do not play a role in current financial accounting and 
reporting theory, regulation and practice. It argues that never in history has there been a 
greater need to pick up the search for a comprehensive theory of financial accounting 
because international financial reporting standards are a reality in today’s world, and their 
development is in the hands of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Thirdly, 
it sketches the outline of a possible comprehensive theory of financial accounting and 
explains what we can and cannot expect from such a theory. We need a comprehensive 
theory of accounting because we need to improve our understanding of how different 
viewpoints of the publicly held corporation might impact income determination models and 
disclosure and valuation paradigms, and of the economic and social consequences that 
accounting and reporting according to the different viewpoints may have. Assuming that the 
IASB truly has the international public interest in mind, such understanding might impact the 
IASB Conceptual Framework and international financial accounting and reporting standards in 
the future. 
1. Introduction 
This paper has three aims. Firstly, it is intended to remind accounting academics, 
practitioners and standard setters of the origins and the substance of the debates about 
equity theories that took place from the late 19
th
 century until the 1970s. Initially, the IASB and 
the FASB made reference to entity theory and the contrasting proprietary theory in their 
convergence project. Their Exposure Draft An improved Conceptual Framework for Financial 
Reporting; Chapter 1 The Objective of Financial Reporting stated: “The boards decided that 
an entity’s financial reporting should be prepared from the perspective of the entity (entity 
perspective) rather than the perspective of its owners or a particular class of owners 
(proprietary perspective).” (IASB/FASB, 2008: 5). The Exposure Draft and some of the 
subsequent comment letters (IASB, 2008) showed that neither the origins of the various 
equity theories, nor their implications for financial accounting and reporting standard setting 
are clear or well-understood. 
 
Equity theories can be understood as incomplete and unsuccessful attempts at formulating a 
comprehensive theory of accounting for corporations. Sometime during the 1970s the search 
for a comprehensive theory of accounting was abandoned by most accounting scholars, 
regulators and practitioners in favour of working hypotheses and theories of the middle 
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range.
1
 The search for a comprehensive theory came to be considered as futile. In its 
Statement on Accounting Theory and Theory Acceptance, the American Accounting 
Association (1977: 1-2) stated that ‘no single governing theory of financial accounting is rich 
enough to encompass the full range of user-environment specifications effectively’. This trend 
may have coincided with the shift away from normative to positive accounting research as 
people increasingly grew frustrated with the lack of analytical rigour in many normative 
accounting articles. As a consequence of abandoning the search for a comprehensive theory 
of financial accounting and reporting of corporations and the move toward empirical 
accounting research, the historical normative equity theories debate was soon all but 
forgotten. 
 
The central issue in the equity theories is as follows. Equity theories provide different views in 
answer to the question whose point of view should be taken in the accounting process of 
companies. (See for example Kam, 1990: 302) In order to answer this question from an 
international accounting theoretical
2
 perspective, it would be necessary to understand what it 
means to take a particular point of view in an accounting process. With respect to the point of 
view taken in accounting, equity theories are incomplete attempts at answering the following 
questions from particular points of view. 
1. Why should we analyse and record transactions and events with respect to their effects on: 
 the company’s shareholders (proprietary perspective) 
 all the company’s providers of financing (older entity perspective) 
 the business entity itself (newer entity perspective) 
 all the stakeholders including non-financial stakeholders and the general public 
(social perspective)? 
2. What does it mean to analyse and record transactions and events with respect to their 
effects on shareholders, all the providers of financing, the business entity itself, or all the 
stakeholders? 
3. Does a particular point of view in the accounting process lead to a specific income 
determination model or accounting measurement, valuation and recognition paradigm? How 
would the income determination model or accounting measurement, valuation and recognition 
paradigm be different if another point of view is taken? 
4. What form should the disclosure of information take in each of these cases? 
                                                 
1
 According to Riahi-Belkaoui (2004: 84), Robert Merton introduced and defined ‘theories of the 
middle range’ as theories in between working hypotheses and a unified theory. (Merton, Robert K., 
1967: 39) 
2
 I am not sure if there is such a thing as international accounting theory. It is meant here as a 
comprehensive financial accounting and reporting theory that is general enough to apply across users 
and environments, and specific enough to offer assistance to the IASB as well as local accounting 
regulators in setting accounting and reporting standards and evaluating their social, economic, financial 
and legal consequences. The IASB Conceptual Framework can be interpreted as an incomplete and 
somewhat biased attempt to establish international accounting theory. 
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5. Do different points of view require different accounting concepts or even conceptual 
frameworks? What are the social, financial, economic and legal consequences of different 
points of view for any of those with a financial or other interest in a company? 
6. If financial accounting and reporting regulation is premised on being in the public interest, 
how should we define the public interest? 
7. What interests does each point of view and associated income determination model and 
accounting measurement, valuation and recognition paradigm serve and how does it do so? 
 
Secondly, this paper seeks to understand why the equity theories, which, as mentioned above, 
were incomplete and unsuccessful attempts at formulating a comprehensive theory of 
financial accounting and reporting of corporations, do not play an apparent role in current 
financial accounting and reporting theory, regulation and practice. Given that the point of view 
taken in the accounting process of companies is equally essential in each of the three areas, 
this absence is surprising and requires some investigation. Never in history has there been a 
greater need for a comprehensive theory of financial accounting and reporting of corporations, 
because of the current internationalisation of financial reporting regulation. Currently, the 
IASB does not claim that its Conceptual Framework is an attempt at building a 
comprehensive theory of accounting. 
 
Nevertheless, if the search for a comprehensive theory of accounting was abandoned 
because there is no single theory that applies across different institutional environments and 
users, then how should we interpret the IASB Conceptual Framework? If the IASB is serving 
the international public interest as it says in the IFRS Constitution
3
, it would do well to 
recognise the need for developing an international accounting theory in the form of a 
comprehensive theory of financial accounting and reporting of corporations that applies 
across all users and institutional environments. For this purpose, increased understanding of 
different environments and users as well as equity theories could contribute to the 
construction of a conceptual (and theoretical) framework that holds across national, 
ideological and developmental boundaries. In other words, the internationalisation of business, 
capital markets and financial accounting regulation has returned the search for a 
comprehensive theory of financial accounting and reporting for corporations on the research 
agenda. 
 
Thirdly, this paper sketches the outline of a possible comprehensive theory of financial 
accounting and explains what we can and cannot expect from such a theory. We need a 
comprehensive theory of accounting because we need to improve our understanding of how 
different viewpoints of the publicly held corporation might impact income determination 
models and disclosure and valuation paradigms, and of the economic and social 
                                                 
3
 The IFRS Foundation’s Constitution at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/B611DD9A-F4FB-4A0D-
AEC9-0036F6895BEF/0/Constitution2010.pdf (accessed on 4 April 2010) 
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consequences that accounting and reporting according to the different viewpoints may have. 
Assuming that the IASB truly has the international public interest in mind, such understanding 
might impact the IASB Conceptual Framework and international financial accounting and 
reporting standards in the future. 
 
Although presently there is a lack of agreement on the precise definition and the concrete 
accounting implications of the various equity theories, the literature indicates some clear 
differences between proprietary and entity perspectives of the firm. These differences 
particularly relate to the purpose of accounting and financial reporting, the distinction between 
debt and equity and its accounting implications for the analysis and recording of transactions 
and recordable events, as well as the definition, determination, disclosure and distribution of 
income. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the development of 
equity theories in the past and identifies the main characteristics of proprietary, entity and 
social theory. Section 3 explores why the equity theories have not been given any 
prominence in current accounting theory, practice and regulations. It also explains why we 
need a comprehensive theory of financial accounting. Section 4 explains what a 
comprehensive theory of financial accounting is and what such a theory can and cannot do. It 
also sketches the outlines of a comprehensive theory of financial accounting in the hope that 
other people will be able to help me fill it in.  
 
2. Equity theories in the past 
This section is aimed at describing the development of equity theories throughout the history 
of accounting for publicly held companies. It will consider the following issues. 
a. What are the main equity theories? 
b. Why did different equity theories develop? 
c. What are the basic accounting implications of proprietary and entity theories? 
d. What accounting issues remain unsettled? 
e. How would disclosure be different under each concept? 
 
2.a. What are the main equity theories? 
Throughout the history of accounting, the question of whose viewpoint should be taken in the 
accounting process of companies has yielded completely different answers that are 
seemingly irreconcilable. (Newlove and Garner, 1951: 20) One reason that the different 
answers are considered irreconcilable is that the viewpoints involve conflicting economic and 
other interests. Another reason is that the viewpoints were considered mutually exclusive 
because general purpose financial statements must articulate and the accounting standards 
and process must be internally consistent. Proprietary theorists such as Hatfield (1909), 
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Sprague (1912), and Husband (1938 and 1952), insisted that the accounting process of 
companies must be conducted from the shareholders’ perspective. Staubus (1952, 1959) 
developed the residual equity theory which considered that the accounting must be done from 
the perspective of the residual equity holders, which for a going concern coincides with that of 
the common shareholders. Residual equity theory is often regarded as a more restrictive form 
of proprietary theory (Belkaoui, 2004: 215). 
 
Early entity theorists such as Gilman (1939), Paton and Littleton (1940), and Chow (1942) 
held that accounting must take the perspective of both the providers of debt and equity 
financing because the business enterprise is operating for the benefit of the equity and debt 
holders (Kam, 1990: 306). Later entity theorists such as Seidman (1956), Raby (1959), and in 
particular, Li (1960, 1961, and 1963), were convinced that the accounting in companies must 
be carried out from the perspective of the accounting entity itself because in practice the 
corporation is operated for the purpose of its own survival rather than in the interest of the 
shareholders or other providers of financing. (Kam, 1990: 306; and Meyer, 1970: 119) 
Suojanen (1954 and 1958) introduced the notion that companies have become institutions in 
their own right and therefore must account from the perspective of the entity which is 
accountable to society at large. 
 
Meyer (1973) mentions other theorists who do not believe that accounting necessarily needs 
to take anyone’s perspective including Canning (1929), AAA (1957), Vatter (1947, 1962), and 
Goldberg (1965). These approaches have had little impact on for-profit accounting and will 
not be discussed in this paper. 
 
2.b. Why did different equity theories develop? 
According to Merino (1993: 170), in the first half of the 20
th
 century, proprietary theorists in the 
USA successfully used proprietary theory to defend shareholders against the threat ‘that the 
corporate form could pose to private property rights’. In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries, 
the democratisation of shareholding together with a tendency towards concentration in 
industries reduced the ability of shareholders to effectively monitor management. 
Consequently, managers increasingly administrated corporations in their own interest rather 
than in that of the shareholders. (See for example Berle and Means, 1932) In the USA, 
because the Sherman Act had outlawed collusion, between 1898 and 1903, market control 
came to mean ‘owning the industry’, which was achieved via mergers. A second wave of 
mergers from 1918 to 1929 was intended to achieve oligopoly rather than monopoly. 
(Espeland and Hirsch, 1990: 81) Merino argues that ‘(b)y developing a model that enabled 
the stockholder/owner to retain ultimate control and techniques that made good watered stock, 
thus restoring the integrity of capital, proprietary theorists appeared to reconcile passive 
ownership with traditional economic justifications of private property rights.’ (Merino, 1993: 
169) 
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The owner of a good is the person who ‘has the exclusive right to make use of the good, to 
earn income from the good, and to manage the good and transfer control of it (or to sell it) to 
another party. (…) It is important to note that the holder of the property right not only has 
rights but also obligations’ (Groenewegen et al, 2010: 93). With respect to the traditional 
economic justification of private property rights, capitalism is based on the assumption that 
well-defined, secure private property rights and competitive markets will incentivise people to 
take care of their property and increase their own and total wealth by increasing production,  
facilitating exchange and allowing market participants to exploit gains from trade. It is 
presumed that in competitive markets, the capitalist economic system will efficiently allocate 
resources and fairly distribute the surplus generated by economic activity. Profits are 
considered the fair reward for skilful entrepreneurial activity and risk taking.  
 
Demsetz (1967) argued that private property rights had developed as a means to counter the 
negative externalities that are often the consequence of communal property. Hardin (1968) 
used a scenario sketched by mathematician William Forster Lloyd in 1833, in which herdsmen 
who maximise their utility in a pasture open to all, end up ruining the pasture. He called the 
situation where the herdsmen were locked in a short-sighted system that caused them to 
maximise their own utility by destroying the pasture, ‘the tragedy of the commons’.
4
 In the late 
18
th
 and early 19
th
 centuries, a similar private property argument may have been used to 
justify the enclosure movement in England at a time of rapid population growth.
5
  
   
Demsetz (1967: 358) discussed three modifications of private property rights in the case of 
the publicly held corporation, i.e., separation of ownership and control, limited liability, and 
shareholders’ right to sell their shares without approval from other shareholders, as solutions 
to the external effects that de facto managerial ownership may have on shareholders. 
Consequently, ‘(w)hat shareholders really own are their shares and not the corporation.’ 
(Demsetz, 1967: 359) The ability and/or incentives for shareholders to monitor managers, 
their legal liability and sense of responsibility for any external consequences of the actions of 
the company have been greatly reduced. In other words, in the publicly held corporation, both 
managers and shareholders have an incentive to disregard any interests of other 
                                                 
4
 Hardin (1968)’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ claims that in a world with finite resources, there is 
ultimately no technological solution to the problems associated with population growth and pollution. 
‘Therein is the tragedy. Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his herd without 
limit – in a world that is limited.’ (Hardin, 1968: 1244) ‘The tragedy of the commons as a food basket 
is averted by private property, or something formally like it. But the air and the waters surrounding us 
cannot readily be fenced, and so the tragedy of the commons as a cesspool must be prevented by 
different means, by coercive laws or taxing devices that make it cheaper for the polluter to treat his 
pollutants than to discharge them untreated.’ (Hardin, 1968: 1245) Hardin was a biologist concerned 
with survival. Economists usually believe that the price mechanism solves the problem of finite 
resources, and that negative externalities can be settled through financial means in the absence of 
bargaining and other transaction costs. See for example, Coase (1960). 
5
 The other justification for the enclosure movement was that the technological developments in the 
wool industry had made a more productive use of the commons necessary and possible. 
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stakeholders. Alchian and Demsetz (1972:789) pointed out that ‘(t)he residual claim on 
earnings enjoyed by shareholders does not serve the function of enhancing their efficiency as 
monitors in the general situation.’ For this reason, they viewed shareholders, not as joint 
owners, but as more optimistic (i.e. less risk-averse) investors than bond holders. Such 
investors care little about voting rights. ‘The only difference is in the probability distribution of 
rewards and the terms on which they can place their bets.’ Alchian and Demsetz (1972:789) 
 
Institutional shareholdings, widely dispersed shareholdings, and speculative investors with a 
less than fleeting interest in the company’s welfare, made the definition of company 
ownership with reference to private property rights more difficult to justify. Therefore, entity 
theorists insist on accounting according to an entity perspective of the firm which does not 
make a strong distinction between providers of debt and equity capital. Paton (1922), and 
Paton and Littleton (1940) advocated entity theory because in their view, limited liability 
precludes a proprietary perspective. Paton and Littleton (1940)’s entity perspective is closely 
connected with their advocating the transactions approach (i.e., the revenue-expense 
approach) to the determination of income and the associated matching of revenues and 
expenses as well as the realisation concept. 
 
Social theorists, such as Suojanen (1954 and 1958) advocate accounting that, in order to 
ensure the survival of the firm, accounting is done keeping in mind the interests of all 
stakeholders including society at large. In practice this meant prudent and neutral 
determination of income, and the disclosure of the company’s value added and the 
distribution thereof. 
 
2.c. Basic accounting implications of the different equity theories 
Accounting for sole traders and general partnerships is done from a proprietary perspective. 
This means that all transactions and events of the business are analysed and recorded with 
respect to their effect on the owners. The proprietors own all the assets and have unlimited 
liability for their debts and obligations as well as their torts. On the one hand, revenues and 
gains increase their net worth. On the other hand, expenses and losses decrease their net 
worth. As mentioned before, the capitalist economic system is founded on private property 
rights, which are premised on the situation that owners have unlimited liability, and that there 
is no separation of ownership, liability/responsibility and control. Therefore, any conflicting 
interests between stakeholders such as those between proprietors and customers, proprietors 
and lenders or creditors, between proprietors and the tax authorities, or between proprietors 
and the general public will always involve the owners who bear full legal and moral 
responsibility as well as financial liability in their dealings with outsiders.  
 
For the publicly held limited company, the question of whose perspective must be taken in the 
accounting process is much more complicated because there is a separation of ownership, 
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liability/responsibility and control, and shareholders have the ability to sell their stake in a 
company at will. The threefold modification of private property rights makes their economic 
justification problematic for the following reasons. Separation of ownership and control 
contributes to the principal-agent problem between shareholders and managers. Limited 
liability creates corporate governance, legal, financial and moral 
accountability/responsibility/liability problems of shareholders and managers to all other 
stakeholders. Furthermore, the ability of shareholders to dispose of shares at will creates a 
non-committal type of attitude towards social responsibility on the part of managers and 
shareholders.  
 
Proprietary theory and residual equity theory 
Under the proprietary view, transactions and events are analysed, recorded and accounted 
for as to their immediate effect on the proprietors. Financial statements are prepared from the 
viewpoint of the proprietors and are meant to measure and analyse their net worth expressed 
by the accounting equation:  
(1) ∑assets - ∑liabilities = ∑equity, proprietorship or net worth  
In the proprietary view, the assets are considered the proprietors’ assets, and the liabilities 
are the proprietors’ liabilities. According to Newlove and Garner (1951: 21) under proprietary 
theory “(l)iabilities are negative assets – negative properties, which must be sharply defined 
and separated in the accounting process.” Revenues are increases in proprietorship and 
expenses are decreases. Net profits, “the excess of revenues over expenses, accrues directly 
to the owners; it represents an increase in the wealth of the proprietors.” (Hendriksen and Van 
Breda, 1992: 770) Staubus (1959) narrowed the concept of owners to common stockholders 
and considered preference shareholders as liability holders and stressed the importance to 
investors of the estimation of future cash receipts. The accounting equation becomes: 
 (2) Assets – Specific Equities (=Liabilities + Preferred Stock) = Residual Equity 
The proprietary approach represents an agency view of the company where the main 
responsibility of management is to manage the firm in the best interests of the owners. As the 
assets and liabilities are considered the owners’ assets and liabilities, the maximisation of 
profits equals maximisation of the increase in the shareholders’ net assets. For this reason, 
the asset/liability approach to income determination, where income is the by-product of the 
valuation of assets and liabilities, is the most direct way of quantifying the increase in net 
assets. Under both the proprietary theory and the asset/liability approach to income 
determination, it is imperative that shareholders’ interests are sharply distinguished from the 
interests of the providers of debt capital in order to be able to measure the increase in net 
assets.  
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Entity theory and enterprise or social theory 
Under the entity view, transactions are analysed as to their effect on the accounting entity. 
Financial statements are prepared from the viewpoint of the entity. The income statement is 
meant to calculate income for distribution and analyse the company’s performance over a 
period, whereas the balance sheet serves to indicate the security or riskiness of the 
company’s financial position. Under the different varieties of entity theory the accounting 
equation may take the following forms.  
(3) ∑assets = ∑liabilities (Paton, 1922) 
Or 
(4) ∑assets = ∑equities (Paton, 1922) 
Or 
(5) ∑assets = ∑equities + ∑liabilities  (Hendriksen and Van Breda,1992: 771) 
In the entity view as expressed in equation 3, the assets are considered the company’s 
assets, and the liabilities are the company’s liabilities. Alternatively, as expressed in equation 
4, the assets are considered the company’s assets and the equities are all the financial 
stakeholders’ equities. Entity theory views the entity as “having a separate existence – an 
arms length relationship with its owners. The relation to the owners is regarded as not 
particularly different from that to the long-term creditors.” (Lorig, 1964: 566) See equation 5. 
 
Suojanen (1954)’s enterprise or social theory sees the large listed corporation as an 
institution with social responsibilities. Companies’ actions affect many different stakeholders 
such as stockholders, creditors, customers, employees, the government as a taxing and 
regulatory authority and the public at large. (Hendriksen and Van Breda, 1992; Kam, 1990; 
Suojanen, 1954) Suojanen traces this institutionalisation of the large enterprise to the 
separation of management and ownership leading to increasingly large proportions of income 
being retained within the company to reduce the corporation’s dependence on external 
financing. Large corporations may decide to pay only ‘conventionally adequate dividends’ 
because this ties in with their survival and growth objectives. (Suojanen, 1958: 56-7)  
 
Financial reports according to the enterprise theory are to be prepared from the perspective of 
the enterprise as a social institution. Income generated by the enterprise is analysed to 
measure the contribution of the enterprise to society using the concepts developed in national 
income analysis. Therefore, ultimately, the balance sheet is secondary to output, income and 
value added considerations. The balance sheet equation expressing the enterprise theory 
according to Meyer (1973: 120) is: 
(6) Assets = Investors’ input contributions 
Suojanen proposes that large companies prepare a value added statement in addition to the 
balance sheet and income statement. “If the enterprise is considered to be an institution, its 
operations should be assessed in terms of its contribution to the flow of output of the 
community.” (Suojanen, 1954: 395)  “Although stockholders have legal rights as owners, from 
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the point of view of the enterprise their rights are subsidiary to the organization and its 
survival.” (Kam, 1990: 315)  
 
The characteristics of the different theories are summarised in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: The purpose of financial reporting, balance sheet equations and income 
determination 
 
Company view Purpose of financial 
accounting 
Balance sheet 
equation 
Income 
determination 
approach 
Proprietary/Agency 
 
Measure net assets and 
increase in net assets 
A – L = E Asset-Liability 
Residual equity 
 
Measure residual equity 
and increase in residual 
equity 
Assets – Specific 
equities = 
Residual equity 
Asset-Liability 
Entity 
 
Assess performance and 
determine income for 
distribution 
A = D + E 
A = L 
A = E 
Revenue-Expense 
Enterprise/Social 
 
Assess contribution to 
society (value added) and 
performance, and show 
distribution of value added 
over stakeholders 
A = Input contrib. Revenue-Expense 
 
2.d. Accounting implications that still need to be clarified 
Probably the most extensive study of the accounting implications of different views of the 
corporation is a dissertation completed in 1956 by Sprouse called The Effect of the Concept 
of the Corporation on Accounting (Sprouse, 1976). He identified 22 items that are affected by 
proprietary, entity, social and legal views of the corporation and discussed their implications 
over three chapters. The title of Chapter 5 was ‘The effect of the concept of the corporation on 
the accounting for transactions involving the corporation’s securities.’ Included were issuance 
of capital stock, retirement and reissuance of treasury stock, stock dividends, stock split-ups, 
conversion of capital stock, issuance of bonds, retirement of bonds at less than book value 
and of bonds at more than book value. (Sprouse, 1976: Chapter 5) The title of Chapter 6 was 
‘The effect of the corporation on the accounting for the measurement and the distribution of 
income.’ He discussed revenue and gains, expenses and losses, and interest charges, 
income taxes and dividends. (Sprouse, 1976: Chapter 6) The title of Chapter 7 was ‘The 
effect of the concept of the corporation on the accounting for other changes in the accounts 
related to the interests of corporate security holders.’ (Sprouse, 1976: Chapter 7) He 
discussed donations of outstanding shares, donations of assets, the gratuitous forgiveness of 
outstanding obligations, the appreciation of assets, and the appropriations of accumulated 
undistributed earnings. Finally, he discussed business combinations. 
 
Lorig (1964: 569) contrasted proprietary and entity theory and indicated some ‘(c)onflicts in 
principles and practice arising out of the proprietary and entity concepts’. One central issue is 
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the question whether or not retained earnings belong to the shareholders (proprietary/residual 
equity) or to the entity (entity/social). One’s point of view on this issue could logically lead to 
different accounting for transactions involving the company’s securities. Accounting for 
revenue, gains, expenses and losses depends on whether financial accounting standards are 
intended to measure income as the increase in net assets or as the surplus of revenue over 
expenses. Whether or not one considers retained earnings as belonging to the shareholders 
or to the entity could have an impact on how to account for what Statement No. 4 and Bird et 
al (1976: 236-7) called non-reciprocal transfers between an enterprise and its owners. 
Examples include cash or property dividends, acquisition of treasury stock, and conversion of 
convertible debt. Accounting for non-reciprocal transfers between the enterprise and entities 
other than its owners, such as gifts, dividends received, taxes, fines, thefts, and the loss of a 
negligence lawsuit could also be done differently depending on whether one takes a 
proprietary or entity view of the corporation. 
 
Around the 1950s, many articles were written on how to account for interest, dividends, 
income and taxation under the proprietary and entity views. Examples include Husband, 1938 
and 1954; Staubus, 1952; Seidman, 1956; Sprouse, 1957; Horngren, 1957; Li, 1960a, 1960b, 
1961. Unfortunately, even in this comparatively narrow area there is no complete agreement 
on exactly what the accounting consequences of each of the views are. It is likely that the 
effort towards a comprehensive theory of accounting was given up because it was not even 
possible to obtain agreement on the consequences of each of the views for accounting for 
income, interest, dividends and taxation. 
 
Confusion also arose because on the one hand, proprietary theorists adopted accounting 
practices that were inconsistent with the proprietary view such as the concept of conservatism, 
the depreciation of non-current assets, and reserve accounting which would result in an 
understatement of distributable income in order to ‘protect stockholders from their own 
rapacity’. (Merino, 1993: 171)  On the other hand, the multiple versions of the entity theory 
were not necessarily consistent with each other. A further factor that contributed to lack of 
clarity was that the accounting system as described by Paton and Littleton (1940) was based 
on a combination of entity theory, the revenue-expense approach to income determination, 
historical cost, and the matching of revenues and expenses. The matching principle came to 
be equated with historical cost and accrual accounting. In turn, accrual accounting came to be 
equated with the revenue-expense approach to income determination, but the entity view was 
lost. 
 
2.e. Implications for disclosure, financial statements and formats 
As the main purpose of financial accounting according to the proprietary view of the publicly 
held corporation is determining the value of net assets and the increase in net assets 
(Belkaoui, 2004: 215), the most appropriate layout of the balance sheet would be the vertical 
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net assets format arranged in order of increasing liquidity as is common in the UK. A category 
in-between liabilities and capital would not be acceptable as it would hamper the 
determination of net assets. The income statement is then secondary to the balance sheet. It 
would show revenues as the increase in ownership and expenses as a deduction of 
ownership. Hence, interest and taxation are considered expenses in order to arrive at income 
attributable to the shareholders. Before the advent of corporation income tax, taxation of 
corporate profits was considered double taxation as the shareholders would also have to pay 
taxes over their dividend and other income. In a strict proprietary view, the income statement 
follows the all-inclusive concept of profits, and all income for the period would be distributed to 
the shareholders because retained earnings do not exist. However, over time, retained 
earnings became more common and came to be considered as belonging to the shareholders.  
 
The entity view of the publicly held corporation considers the income statement the primary 
statement as it enables assessment of performance over the period, and the calculation of 
dividends for distribution and earnings to be retained in the company. The balance sheet was 
secondary as it was not meant to indicate the firm’s value, but rather to show the company’s 
assets and all the stakeholders’ interests in order to give an indication of solvency and the 
security of any assets pledged as collateral. Prudence and reliability were probably the 
overriding principles in the entity view. Retained earnings belong to the company, only paid in 
capital belongs to the shareholders. 
 
In the enterprise or social view, the financial statements as mentioned under the entity view 
are supplemented by a value added statement which would fit in with a country’s national 
accounts. Experiences with value added statements in Germany and the UK in the 1970s 
showed that in practice the preparation of value added statements suffers from the same 
problems as other financial statements. 
 
3. Equity theories in the present 
Equity theories do not presently play a role in financial accounting and reporting theory or 
practice. The recognition and acknowledgement of different views on the publicly held 
corporation might cause accounting researchers to respect, analyse and understand the 
reasons for these different views, rather than ignore them or make value judgements about 
them. Proprietary, entity and social views of the corporation developed out of legitimate 
concerns about the consequences of the separation of ownership and control, limited liability 
and the ability of shareholders to sell their shares at will. These problems are still nowhere 
near to being solved even though publicly held corporations have been around for more than 
a century. The inherently conflicting interests between all stakeholders of corporations render 
any agreement on a final resolution highly unlikely. 
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Nevertheless, as IFRS have been accepted in countries with very different institutions, it is 
more important than ever that international accounting standard setters search for a 
comprehensive theory of financial accounting. For this purpose, accounting researchers and 
standard setters need to better understand the different roles of financial accounting in 
environments that are divergent in terms of capital market development, economic 
development, economic and political ideology, and any other institutional aspects. The equity 
theories could form a starting point for creating internally consistent accounting paradigms 
based on each of the views on the corporation without any concern for the accounting 
paradigms’ political and ideological viability. One problem with the IASB/FASB Conceptual 
Framework as a source of financial accounting theory is that it is primarily suited for financial 
reporting and capital markets in the USA. Another problem is that the exposure drafts and 
comments form an ad hoc consensus process, which makes the outcome a matter of political 
influence and serendipity, and possibly inconsistent, biased and incomplete. 
 
The IASB/FASB Conceptual Framework convergence project is currently working on a 
definition of the reporting entity. Its Exposure Draft ED/2010/2, for which comments were to 
be received by 16 July 2010, describes the reporting entity as:  
a circumscribed area of economic activities whose financial information has the 
potential to be useful to existing and potential equity investors, lenders and other 
creditors who cannot directly obtain the information they need in making decisions 
about providing resources to the entity and in assessing whether the management and 
the governing board of that entity have made efficient and effective use of the 
resources provided. The reporting entity concept is intended to further this objective. 
(IASB, ED/2010/2: RE2) 
Note that the IASB Exposure Draft is talking about the reporting entity instead of the business 
entity, the economic entity or the accounting entity. The objective of financial reporting in the 
conceptual framework refers to a ‘reporting entity’ and therefore the IASB is of the opinion 
that a reporting entity needs to be identified. (IASB, ED/2010/2: BC4) The conceptual 
framework is concerned with financial reporting and does not refer to financial accounting. 
 
In a letter dated 15 July 2010, the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) 
responds to the Exposure Draft and states the following.  
We consider that the perspective from which the financial statements are presented is 
critical and should be discussed in the Conceptual Framework. Clarifying the 
‘perspective’ is important in assessing how to resolve accounting policy issues and is 
central to considering how to satisfy the objective of financial reporting. Accordingly, we 
think it is necessary to carry out an in-depth analysis of the implications of adopting 
either perspective and to ensure they are properly debated. 
Note that EFRAG’s letter talks about ‘the implications of either perspective’. This refers to 
either the entity or the proprietary perspective. It does not acknowledge the social perspective 
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or any of the other equity theories. However, it is clear that EFRAG recognises that a 
perspective is important in resolving accounting policy issues and determining the purpose of 
financial reporting. 
 
3.a. Why did we forget about the equity theories?  
The above historical overview of the equity theories has taught us that the different 
perspectives of the publicly held corporation developed in response to the three modifications 
of private property rights. Proprietary theory developed to defend the justification of the 
private property rights of shareholders as owners of the corporation. Entity theory developed 
in answer to the recognition that shareholders of a publicly held corporation own the shares 
but not the corporation or the assets of the corporation. Enterprise theory or social theory 
developed from the understanding that large publicly held corporations are institutions in their 
own right, the managers of which ought to be responsible and accountable to all stakeholders 
including society at large. In other words, the entity view and the social view of the corporation 
are accounting theoretical expressions of the idea that the traditional economic justifications 
of private property rights have limited validity in the case of the publicly held corporation. 
 
At various times in history, the modifications of private property rights were considered 
problematic. In the UK, the South Sea Bubble of 1719-1721 clearly instilled an awareness of 
the dangers of the joint stock corporation to the extent that it took until the Joint Stock 
Companies Act 1844 and the Limited Liability Act 1855 to give the public limited company a 
second chance. ‘The concept of limited liability was a contentious point in the politics of the 
mid-nineteenth century.’ (Glautier and Underdown, 1994: 6) In the US, the problem of 
separation of ownership and control was clearly recognised, analysed and described by Berle 
and Means (1932) and may have led to the development of agency theory. Limited liability 
and the ability of shareholders to sell their shares at will enable speculation, which constituted 
the main reason for the establishment of the SEC and the Securities and Exchange Laws in 
the US in 1933 and 1934. In the Companies Acts in the UK as well as the Securities and 
Exchange Laws in the USA, the solution was thought to be mandatory public financial 
disclosure, although the actual standard setting was delegated to private regulators. 
 
The agency theory framework seeks to resolve the problems associated with the separation 
of ownership and control by means of corporate governance mechanisms and regulations. It 
does not address the problems related to limited liability and the ability of shareholders to sell 
their shares at will. Financial reporting regulations were intended to address the problems of 
limited liability and the ability of shareholders to sell their shares at will. Unfortunately, the 
very reason for financial reporting and corporate governance regulation seems forgotten.  
Other roundabout attempts of dealing with these problems include business and professional 
ethics in accounting and finance, corporate social responsibility and corporate social 
responsibility reporting. Although professional accountants and financial analysts supposedly 
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adhere to a code of ethics, the ethics they are being taught seems to be for the sake of 
morality and not as a means of addressing the problems created by the modifications of 
private property rights. Managers do not even have a professional code of ethics. Some might 
even consider business and ethics as contradictions in terms. 
 
It seems that the problematic nature of private property rights in the case of the publicly held 
corporation and their implications for accounting have been ignored or perhaps not been 
recognised by the IASB. Thus it was possible for the IASB to propagate the entity view as the 
perspective from which financial statements should be prepared, whilst at the same time 
issuing financial reporting standards that follow the balance sheet approach to income 
determination, which is decidedly proprietary. 
 
So why did we forget about equity theories and fail to realise their importance to accounting 
theory, practice and regulation? Firstly, as mentioned above, in the 1970s, the distinction 
between positive and normative accounting came to be made, and people had grown 
impatient with the lack of rigour in many normative accounting writings. Positive accounting 
theory was not concerned with a comprehensive theory of accounting. Empirical studies are 
by nature limited to smaller questions. Secondly, the piece-meal approach to regulation within 
national boundaries fostered a piece-meal approach to establishing and studying accounting 
standards and their consequences. Thirdly, although many people do recognise the problems 
associated with the separation of ownership and control, they do not see this as in any way 
diminishing the justification for the private property rights attached to shareholdings in publicly 
held corporations as corporate governance mechanisms have been devised to address this 
problem. Many do not see or are simply not willing to acknowledge the problematic nature of 
private property rights in the case of limited liability and the ability to sell shares at will.  
Speculation based on investors’ different expectations with regard to future prices is 
necessary to increase the efficiency of markets. How much speculation makes a market 
efficient and how much speculation destabilises a market is perhaps an empirical question. 
How much market efficiency should we require is perhaps an ideological question, which is 
why even academic discussions on private property rights tend to be coloured by the political 
divide. Fourthly, since the late 1970s, the political climate in the most powerful western 
countries has steadily inclined towards deregulation, privatisation and laissez-faire. Central 
banks and financial regulators make the incentives-stability trade-off in favour of incentives in 
gambling that fast economic growth will bring prosperity for all, rather than destabilise the 
financial and economic system. Business schools and institutions extending professional 
accounting and financial qualifications have reinforced this tendency by uncritically embracing 
the efficient market hypothesis in finance and accounting education. 
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4. Equity theories in the future 
International financial accounting and reporting regulation is a new area that is being 
designed right now. International financial accounting until the late 1990s was mainly an area 
of international comparison and classification. International financial reporting from about 
2000 onwards became an area of financial reporting for multinational corporations. It appears 
that this is still the mindset of many on the IASB. However, when the IASB grudgingly started 
its IFRS for SMEs project, and when the IMF and World Bank required the use of IFRS as a 
condition for providing funding and many countries accepting IFRS in the hope of attracting 
foreign investment, both financial accounting and reporting theory and the IASB Conceptual 
Framework, developed a need to become both comprehensive and internationally inclusive. 
The equity theories provide a starting point for the identification of a comprehensive theory of 
accounting. Although they are incomplete, each theory is an attempt at creating a logical, 
coherent and internally consistent accounting model from one particular perspective of the 
publicly held corporation. It extends from clarifying the rationale for choosing one particular 
perspective, to the purpose of financial reporting and via an income determination model to 
the format in which information must be disclosed. 
 
A comprehensive theory of financial accounting and reporting would place into one single 
framework the different views of the publicly held corporation and their associated income 
determination models, measurement and valuation paradigms and disclosure formats. It 
would explain what the social, economic, legal and behavioural assumptions are behind the 
different income determination models, measurement and valuation paradigms, as well as the 
financial statement formats and other means of disclosure. This clarifies the place of financial 
accounting and reporting as a social science and gives a foundation for the debate on the 
purpose of financial accounting and reporting regulation. Is financial accounting and reporting 
regulation meant to redress imperfections in the market for information? Is it meant to improve 
resource allocation and distribution in an economy or in the international economy, i.e., 
Pareto efficiency? Or is it meant to enable all stakeholders in corporations to maintain a 
minimum level of protection of their interests, i.e., equity? Do we want to increase capital 
market efficiency? If so, why, how much efficiency should we aim for, and what mechanism 
accomplishes how much of an increase in capital market efficiency? 
 
A comprehensive theory of accounting and financial reporting would need to clarify the 
relation between private property rights, common property rights and the role of negative 
externalities (public costs) in the determination of private income. Proprietary theory 
disregards negative externalities in the determination of income attributable to shareholders, 
entity theory disregards negative externalities in the determination of entity income, but social 
theory determines the creation and distribution of value added which explicitly considers all of 
society as stakeholders in the corporation as an institution. 
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A comprehensive theory of financial accounting and reporting would need to reconcile the 
different views and income determination models, and clarify what their social and economic 
consequences would be in theory so that they can be assessed in practice. However, it would 
not be a one size fits all theory. 
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